

— Anders Pedersson, »Freedom under conditions of necessity«

— A B S T R A C T —

In this paper I explore a certain conception of ideology with the aim of situating the subject conducting intellectual work acting under given premises. A theory of ideology based on Paul Ricoeur's work on the subject offers a frame in which ideology functions in a positive and negative manner, at the same time according to a fundamental structure. In the second half of the paper I discuss the notion of utopia as a way to move beyond ideology, or at least push its limits.

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■ — Anders Pedersson — ■

■ — FREEDOM UNDER CONDITIONS OF
NECESSITY — ■

■ — INTRODUCTION — ■

We are not done with the concept of ideology. Like other writers before me, I take the recurring return of the concept as a sign of its relevance and as a promise of its usefulness.¹ A basic notion of ideological thought is that it is an idea, thought or argument somehow depending on the position, interest or affiliation of the person uttering it. The one speaking through ideology is not free; his or her thought is marked by the social, economic or political conditions under which it is produced.

In this article I wish to discuss how the problem of ideology is best approached, not only in the sense of making possible a critique of ideology, but also how one should consider the risk of slipping into ideology in every case of systematic thinking, whether one calls it science, philosophy or something else. With point of departure in Paul Ricoeur's theory of ideology and utopia, where the latter might be a way to supersede the first, I would like to touch upon the question of intellectual freedom under conditions of necessity. How does the problem of ideology effect and determine intellectual work concerning itself with man and society? The aim of this article is to formulate a theoretical framework in which such a question can be answered.

I believe that the concept of ideology is needed, partly at least, in order to point to what is doubtful in a statement or an idea. Ideology as a concept persists because it makes it possible to point to the partial in a statement, to deem it as determined by the social, economic and historical circumstances under which it is uttered. The pointing out of ideology is an accusation, something one ascribes to one's opponent. But, from which perspective does one make such a judgment? According to Karl Mannheim, one of the first to connect the idea of ideology to that of utopia, this question needs to be answered: »As long as one does not call his own position into question but regards it as absolute, while interpreting his opponent's ideas as the mere function of the social position they occupy, the decisive step forward has not yet been taken.«² This paradox – that even the critic of ideology is somewhat effected by it – should not, however, be seen as a dead end. Rather, it is an opportunity and a starting point for a theory of ideology.

The challenge of Mannheim demands a theory of ideology that considers both the partial and the universal structure of ideology, and thus both a positive and negative notion of the

concept. We need a theory that can account for the force that constitutes, as Göran Therborn puts it, the subjects of history as well as the subjects of the prince.³ The theoretical discussion has to account for a force which, at the same time as it dominates us, makes us able to act and resist. With such a theory in place we can contemplate the possibility of ideas and thoughts going beyond ideology. I want to dwell especially upon in which way science of man and society can be understood in this frame of thinking.⁴ I will conclude my argument with a discussion of utopia as a way to set out a direction for such an endeavor.

Needless to say, this paper doesn't set out to fully cover the long discussions of the concepts of ideology and utopia. Neither is it an effort to develop new theories of either concept. The aim is rather to see how ideology and utopia can be related to each other in a certain context. The theoretical notions of ideology and utopia put forward in this paper should therefore be considered in relation to this article's very practical concern to explore the possibilities of free intellectual work under conditions of necessity.

— IDEOLOGY —

The text that often comes to stand for the beginning of the critical discourse on ideology is Marx and Engels *The German Ideology*. It is here that the famous picture of ideology working as *camera obscura* is presented and a whole range of different statements on the functions of ideology are first put forward. One fragment of this text can work as to frame the problematic of this essay. This statement is one of the most cited in the study of ideology, on good grounds, since it put forward a set of problems and relations which are the reason why the concept of ideology always returns, and always will return into political and social discourse. It is Marx's statement about the form that the ruling ideas of an era take:

— Each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.⁵

This is an elaboration of the more mechanical statement a page earlier, where Marx declares that »the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas«. ⁶ This statement is, I believe, not so much a theoretical explication as an historical observation. We cannot say that ideas prevalent in society are, by definition, expressions of the interests of the ruling class; nevertheless, this is often the case and when it is, it comes to be as the result of a process and conflict around the question of

representing an *interest*. This is not a question of lying, deceiving or convincing; rather, ideas and ideology are made universally valid through the context, structures and institutions in which they are promoted.

With this as a starting point for a discussion of ideology, the theory put forward by Paul Ricoeur is most useful. In a way, it is an effort to mesh the tradition of hermeneutics and Marxism; I believe that with the help of this kind of thinking we can understand ideology in a negative and a positive way. It is a theory that is able to account both for the constitution of ideologically distorted knowledge, and for ideology as a frame in which it is possible to act. Most of all, it makes it possible to consistently and coherently account for the position of the one analyzing or criticizing ideology, which must be the starting point for any discussion about the role of science and other types of intellectual labor in this context.⁷

Ricoeur starts his argument with perhaps the most common notion of ideology: that of false consciousness, as distortion of reality, often as the result of a political consideration. This is the notion the concept takes in everyday language and one could argue that it is this notion that makes the concept of ideology persistent in political and social discourse. This definition of ideology is only partial, however. One can take into consideration the terms used to characterize ideology: distortion, reversal, obfuscation. These do not allude to falsity or pure lies about the state of things. Rather, they point to a fundamental relation between ideology and reality. Ricoeur takes as one of his premises for the continued investigation that ideology should be understood as standing in an ambiguous relation to *reality* and not, as a strong Marxist current would have it, in opposition to *science*.⁸ Ideology is not something that can be expelled by science, but something that imposes itself on and co-produces the social reality in which we live and act. For Ricoeur, this social reality can be reduced to individuals producing and reproducing under given conditions. The main question then becomes: how can this reality, which is constitutive of our existence as societal beings, become distorted?

What is it that is distorted in the traditional notion of ideology? Examining a long discussion of ideology, starting with Marx and moving forward with the help of Weber, Mannheim, Althusser, Habermas and Geertz, Ricoeur stress the *integrating* function of ideology. Theoretically, the most basic function of ideology is that it creates the possibility of social meaning and the efficacy of social action, and that it creates and holds together a social group. According to Ricoeur, we should not understand it as distortion and class domination. If we did, every social relation would work as such.⁹ The political and social reality of a group is symbolic and therefore something

– i.e. ideology – needs to exist for us to be able to speak about and act upon it in a meaningful way. A theory of ideology is therefore a theory of the possibilities and impossibilities of social action and interaction. Ideology is not something that can be dissolved by science in order to show us the reality beyond; rather, it is the force that makes our social reality stable and able to comprehend.

One should not, however, draw the conclusion that such integration is an innocent aspect of ideology in relation to ideology as distortion. To serve its basic function, Ricoeur reminds us, ideology needs to be »simplifying and schematic« and needs to reach a level of exclusion so as to constitute the social group in question.¹⁰ The social group is not constituted in nothing out of nothing, but in a world ridden with conflict and tensions. The prime example is that of the nation, which integrates those inside at the same time as excluding those outside. Under this condition, ideas, thoughts and concepts »lose rigor in order to enhance their social efficacy«.¹¹ This is the price paid for the possibility of social action and social communication, and we should be careful about equating it to distortion.

On the one hand, Ricoeur establishes ideology as integration; on the other, ideology as distortion. What is distorted by the latter is the symbolic reality constituted by the first. The question is why this happens. Taking his starting point in the work of Weber, Ricoeur inserts between *ideology as integration* and *ideology as distortion* the notion of *ideology as domination*. Ideology comes into play to justify the system of authority. The social structure is not only symbolic, it is also hierarchical (according to Ricoeur, the social context in which a concept of ideology can be useful always has some kind of hierarchy). Seeking legitimacy, rulers need to make a claim on their subjects, demanding their faith in the existing order. This is a hard won faith. As Ricoeur phrases it; »there is always more in the claim raised by authority than in the belief held by members of a group«.¹² We can be sure that there will never be an order rational to everyone. Ideology, then, functions to make subjects content with the social order (or in any case, act as if they were). It fills the gap between the dominated subject's belief and the ruler's demand of obedience, service, passivity, etc. In other words, ideology works to assert a partial interest as a universal one.

We need here to pause and consider Ricoeur's vocabulary of ruler and ruled, which are general terms rather than specific references to conflicting interests. We then need to relate that to Marx's statement that »the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas«.¹³ If we want to be somewhat more specific than Ricoeur but still not succumb to a reductionism in which a concept of ideology hardly matters, we need

a more nuanced notion of class, something like that put forward by Bourdieu.¹⁴ In considering social and cultural capital, we can better understand the conjuncture in different ideologies and we can understand how different social strata and social classes consolidate themselves in and by ideology.¹⁵ The relation between interest and ideology is not one in which the first simply define the second, but rather a reciprocal and strengthening relationship.

Having treated the notions of integration and domination, we can better understand the traditional notion of ideology as distortion. What is distorted is the symbolic structure of reality for a group and it is done in a hierarchical system. It is important to stress that for Ricoeur the fact that social reality is hierarchical does not demand that ideology functions as distortion. The distortive function comes to the fore not when we talk about rulers, subject and domination in general, but when we see a specific group claiming domination in times of conflict. It is when rule is challenged that distortion starts. It is then that the real relationships between ruler and ruled are misrepresented, when relations are depicted as things, and when contingency is presented as natural law. Ricoeur believes that quintessential of this is class conflict, waged between the ruling bourgeoisie and the emerging working class; but as new interest arises, so do new conflicts and new counterparts.¹⁶ When it gets to this point, ideology functions in the way it is understood in traditional Marxist terms: as reversal, as inverted reality, as a veil over reality. I would add that it is here that it also functions as understood in everyday discourse: as the voice of partial interest, not a free thought but as a thought determined by the social, political or economic interests being promoted. Still, this obfuscation is possible, this almost devious speech can persist, only if it retains an element of mediation and integration. If it didn't, it would be exposed not as ideology but as violence, fiction or pure lie.

Ricoeur's schema over different aspects of ideology is in itself simplifying. One can, of course, raise doubts whether ideology as integration ever can exist without functioning in a hierarchical way in the slightest. Can we even understand such an order? Is there really such a state of things? And if distortion starts at the point when authority is challenged, is it not always the case in one way or another, given the obvious social contradictions in the system of the world we live in? Ricoeur is well aware of the complexity of the reality of ideology. He sees the different sides of ideology at play at the same time. What Ricoeur seems most interested in is ideology as distortion; the other aspects are dwelled upon to better understand this form.¹⁷ We are best served by understanding these different aspects of ideology not as stages or levels, but as a continuum which makes it possible to understand the functioning of

ideology and the possibility to critique and act inside its frame.

Ricoeur is careful to make clear that he does not see ideology as a counterpart to science. If it is something at the opposing pole of ideology it is *reality*, but it is a reality no longer accessible to people in advanced societies without the integration and mediating function of ideology. Science is therefore part of ideology and cannot simply be called upon to expel or counter ideology. Nevertheless, Ricoeur, like this author, would still like to keep some kind of distinction between ideology and science, even if one acknowledges that this for so long has been an easy way to superficially bypass the problem of ideology.¹⁸ The place for science needs to be recognized as an activity that systematically and consciously is executed in and by ideology. The central component for any scientific thinking striving to be non-ideological is the understanding of the very structure of ideology. Fundamentally, ideology acts in a mediating way and sets up the possibility for every social action. This understanding might not be enough, however. The science that tries to challenge ideology must, I believe, always contemplate its *direction*

— U T O P I A —

This notion of ideology and its relation to science has consequences for the aim of this paper, which is to explore the possibilities of free intellectual work under conditions of necessity. It is clear that one cannot rise above given circumstance, neither material or ideological. Every time one enters into or acts from within a social discourse, one becomes entangled in ideology from the start. Furthermore, it seems near to impossible to remove oneself from its web. We will forever be followed by what Slavoj Žižek has called »the specter of ideology«. ¹⁹ This specter haunts every idea, thought and critique. At the very time we believe we have stepped outside ideology, we are suddenly inside it again. It seems impossible to ever depart from its realm. That is the structure of our social reality, it seems. Nevertheless, given the structure of ideology, a sort of critique of it is still possible. From inside, one is able to point out the dominating function of certain ideological expressions. Ideology cannot and need not to abolish every critique. But critique is often unable to go much further than that and, as has been seen many times, may very well regress into being »her majesty's loyal opposition«. In time of rising conflicts, when there are cracks in the wall, one can, from inside its walls, spot the distortive function of ideology. But as have been noted since Marx, to expose the ideological character of something, to unmask the phenomenon, to show that things aren't really the way they are portrayed, does not make ideology go away or stop functioning.²⁰

This view of ideology and the possibilities of the subject to act within it raise legitimate doubts whether anything, science or not, can help us be non-ideological. This does not mean that we should not try, but this theoretical insight sets up the conditions for our activity. It means that we will *always* have to have a direction, constantly charter the borders of ideology and aim for its transgressions, because ideology will continuously change. But how to set out that direction? How will we know that we are looking beyond ideology, given that it is the very condition for our communication and action?

I do, as mentioned, believe that science can be put to work to challenge ideology. That does not mean that science is non-ideological per definition; nor does it mean that only science can perform this task. However, I believe that a reflexive kind of science makes it possible to work systematically and consciously to produce positive knowledge which can, by finding resonance in social groups, point beyond ideology. The scientist won't be able to become free from ideology by individual strength alone. It's not hard to think thoughts beyond ideology; the challenge is to create knowledge that can be put into practice, to make it possible to act upon those structures and institutions through which ideology functions. Those structures and institutions do not uphold ideology in and for themselves, however. With the help of Ricoeur, we have put *interest* at the center of the problem of ideology. That which distorts our social reality is not structures but certain interests that seek to assert partial interest as universal.²¹ Hence, the battle against and possible transgression of ideology should also have an interest at its core.²²

In a science that tries to challenge ideology, this interest should not be a disinterest; to not take an interest in the research of man and society is inevitably to do the work of another, more often than not dominant interest. Neither should it be an anti-interest. The critique of domination should not have non-domination its objective, since domination is not in place for its own sake but promotes and secures an interest. For the same reason, the critique of distorted communication should not only aim for undistorted communication. Freedom under conditions of necessity can never consist in floating free, but in the possibility of taking a position. A critic of ideology can easily think away or negate. But the critique becomes forceful and persistent when it replaces the ideological image; not when it thinks away or points to the »not really«, but shows an option.

It is at this point that Ricoeur introduces the concept of utopia. As Ricoeur asks, »may we not say [...] that imagination itself – through its utopian function – has a *constitutive* role in helping us *rethink* the nature of our social life«. ²³ For Ricoeur, utopia is only a nowhere for the time being. Utopia is not a void, the place of »not ideology«. Rather, it is a place that makes

claims about how things ought to be. It recasts the questions of domination, rules and the way society works, but does not do away with them. Finally, it is definitely not a fairytale with severed ties to the present. The relation to ideology makes utopia something both near and far away. In Ricoeur's words: »Between the presently unrealizable and the impossible in principle lies an intermediary margin.«²⁴

It is from a certain kind of utopia, I believe, that we are able not only to forcefully criticize but also to produce positive knowledge. It is from there that science should be conducted, by way of both scrutinizing and mobilizing. Our interest should be a utopian one by the standards of the present. Utopia could then function as a picture of contrast, to open up new ways of thinking, to produce new possibilities of action. If ideology is a false universality, a partial interest represented as the only rational order, utopia need to be a radical break with that. Utopia could be put forward as true universality, in contrast to the false one of ideology, but could just as well be pictured as an alternative partial view. The important thing for utopia to stay utopia is that it is understood as an *alternative*. If the utopian dream comes true and this is forgotten, if it becomes embedded in institutions, structures and practices and starts to represent itself as a universal interest, it has become ideology.

Even utopian science and knowledge, however, must, as a social activity, be anchored in the social reality only available to us through ideology. The placing of interest at center stage does not do away with an aim for truth, impartiality, systematicity, and transparency in the scientific endeavor. It is rather a way to acknowledge and make use of its inevitable role in producing of knowledge.

Karl Mannheim was one of the first to explore the relationship between ideology and utopia and is a starting point for Ricoeur's discussion. For Mannheim, the characteristic of utopia is incongruence with present reality. However it shares this trait with ideology. What sets utopia apart from ideology is that its incongruent thought shatters the existing order.²⁵ This, of course, can only be judged in hindsight. There is therefore, notes Ricoeur, in the here and now no qualitative difference between ideology and utopia.

Ricoeur is critical of Mannheim's inability to distinguish between ideology and utopia. For Ricoeur, the two are separable, but at the same time vital to every society. A society without ideology is a society without structure and anchoring; a society without utopias is a rigid society without dreams and real aspirations. Ultimately, Ricoeur's own methodological considerations on the investigation of ideology and utopia boil down to a sort of critical hermeneutics and the old hermeneutic circle renewed as a hermeneutic spiral: Both ideology and utopia are and must be a part of every society. By moving back

and forth between them we can reach a better understanding of things.²⁶

This is an attractive notion of the relation between ideology and utopia. It bears resemblance to what has been put forward by Frederic Jameson.²⁷ Drawing on Ernst Bloch, Jameson concludes that ideological thinking is impossible without a utopian component. Even the clearest expressions of class interest, ideology in its purest form, show signs of utopian ambition in their reference to a totality. The question of utopia is not its relation to ideology and power in certain situations, but as part of the universal structure of the narrative.

At this point I depart from Ricoeur and the view he shares with Jameson. However inviting such notions of ideology and utopia are (not least for interpretive activity), if we are looking for guidance and direction for our own activity we are left unsatisfied. These notions are useful for understanding the structure of social reality, but they do not help us to solve the problem at hand, the question of freedom under conditions of necessity.

If the notion of utopia is to work as a regulative principle, there needs to be a clear distinction between ideology and utopia in time: Utopia should not only be viewed as something that is always potentially there. A science or philosophy that tries to transcend the ideological should consciously articulate and declare a utopia. This »nowhere at the time being« offers a position from which not only to criticize but also to produce positive knowledge in real conflict with the present ideology. The problem of the reification and transformation of one's own interest and critique into ideology needs to be a later problem.

Arriving at this point, we can state the utopian project as articulating a future from the present. This temporal dimension is, of course, not enough. That would be saying that everything that can be articulated as not now is non-ideological. There also has to be a possible break with the ideology present at a given point. It needs to strive to counterpoise existing domination and make visible the reality distorted by the ruling order. It must counter the interest which asserts itself through ideology. By now it should be clear that utopia is not by definition something always good and beneficial for a majority of people. Utopia is not a question of content and therefore neither of necessarily beautiful dreams. What can be defined as utopian thought is exclusively determined by its relation to ideology and the present order.

— PROVISIONAL UTOPIAS —

The question that needs to be asked is how a project of knowledge production with a utopian aim should be constructed. I now wish to put forward some thoughts that can function as a starting point for further discussion.

I think it's necessary to stress that utopia in this context, and here I again differ from Ricoeur, is *not* a question of sophisticated, detailed future plans like that of the original utopian work of Thomas More or of the so called utopian socialists like Saint-Simon. So as not to let the concept lead thoughts in the wrong direction and allude to something unattainable, I wish to qualify this further. It is here I want to put forward Ernst Wigforss's idea of *provisional utopias*.²⁸ We should bear in mind that Wigforss uses the term in a very practical way to advance radical reform politics, but the structure of thinking could be used in relation to the problem of ideology and the ambition to challenge it.²⁹ The terms of the concept explain it well. The utopian part implies that we should formulate the aims of our activity, not only aiming for the possible, but also setting out the impossible, to see if it can be achieved. In Wigforss's phrase, we should pull the own lines of thought »as far into the future so that the deviations from the present becomes sufficiently obvious«. ³⁰ Our goals need to be placed at such a distance to allow the incongruence with the present to become immediately and obviously clear. It is a goal that should be formulated in the present and *stretched* out in time. It is not to regress into arbitrary wishful thinking. This will inevitably lead to tensions, because there will not be agreement on the future goal between different interests. The structures and institutions upholding ideology will have to be countered. Support and rallying around the utopia is needed to make it more than a dream to scoff at. Our project is therefore found at every given moment in history; we mobilize and act in the present through the perspective of the future, with help of tools from the past.

The success of the utopian intellectual action depends on the support and momentum it can gain here and now. To interact with the foundations of ideology, one needs more than just to see and point out that things aren't what they seem to be. The interest that thrives on domination in society must be countered. The conditions that uphold domination need to be challenged; options need to be imagined and produced. The specter of ideology cannot be avoided, however: what was utopia today is ideology tomorrow. For Wigforss it is vital that we articulate a utopia anchored in reality. It is therefore necessary that our goals are always re-considered, are always up for evaluation and reevaluation.³¹ In this way they are provisional. This demands, I believe, that the utopian goal beyond ideology needs to be in constant movement. Because just defending what there is, whatever that may be, will be either futile or will regress into ideology.³² There is no solution in sight, no way to come to rest in relation to ideology. The social contradictions in the system make sure that constant action is both meaningful and necessary if one is to counter or transcend ideology's limits.

Which utopian constructions are ultimately seen as just and fair, and which are effective and victorious in challenging ideology, is a question of experience and evaluation.³³ This author is convinced that the fairest, the most effective and most persisting utopian notion is the one that adheres to the fundamentals of life. That means a utopia that functions, to put it traditionally, in the realm of conflict between labor and capital. But this utopia is not given by the theory as such. Mannheim's judgment from the future cannot be put aside; but the task of pushing the limits of ideology, of interacting with its foundations and advocating non-ideological thinking, must be possible in the present. ■

■ — E N D N O T E S — ■

1 For a review of the discussion of ideology in the second half of the 20th century, see Terry Eagleton: *Ideology. An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London, 2007). For a discussion of the persistence of the notion of ideology, see Slavoj Žižek: »The Spectre of Ideology«, in Slavoj Žižek (ed.): *Mapping Ideology* (London, 1994).

2 Karl Mannheim: *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, 1936), 77. Much is to be said about Mannheim's analysis of ideology; the most astonishing is his solution to the very problem highlighted in the quote. For Mannheim, a cold and distant intellectual mind can rise itself above the partial views of each and every person.

3 Göran Therborn: *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London, 1982), vii.

4 When I talk about the sciences of man and society, I primarily refer to social sciences and the humanities. Furthermore, my definition of scientific work is rather loose. Science is an activity striving for a systematic, transparent, impartial and social production of knowledge.

5 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels: *The German Ideology* (New York, 1998 [1845/1846]), 68f.

6 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels: *The German Ideology*, 67.

7 Ricoeur has elaborated his theory of ideology in several places. The main work is a series of lectures; Paul Ricoeur: *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1986). Shorter introductions to different parts of the argument could be found in Paul Ricoeur: »Can There be a Scientific Concept of Ideology?«, in Joseph Bien (ed.): *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences. A Dialogue*, (Amsterdam, 1978) and in Paul Ricoeur: *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1981), chapter 9: »Science and Ideology«.

8 Paul Ricoeur: *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 103ff.

9 Paul Ricoeur: *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 261ff.

10 Paul Ricoeur: *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 226.

11 Paul Ricoeur: *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 226.

12 Paul Ricoeur: »Can There be a Scientific Concept of Ideology?«, 49.

13 I think this vagueness on Ricoeur's part is both for the good and the bad. It is good that he doesn't close the question of ideology off to all the other conflicts that exists, but the lack of concreteness runs the risk of slipping in to idealism.

14 See for example Pierre Bourdieu: *Distinction. Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (London, 1984).

15 What is absolutely pivotal though, is that a broadening of the concept of class doesn't turn the problem of ideology into a tautology which gives its definition as »the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas and the ruling class of every epoch are the one that express the ruling ideas«.

16 Paul Ricoeur: *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 229ff.

17 I would argue that this is ideology proper and that it makes full sense to use the derogatory form in everyday discourse. In social and historical analysis, its other aspects should not be forgotten.

18 See especially chapter 9: »Science and Ideology« in Paul Ricoeur: *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*.

19 Slavoj Žižek: »The Spectre of Ideology«.

20 For a discussion of how that insight lay at the core of Marx's, thinking see Jorge Larrain: *The Concept of Ideology* (London, 1979), 176ff. For a more contemporary discussion of the same thoughts, see Slavoj Žižek: *Ideologins sublima objekt* (Göteborg, 2001), 36ff.

21 A specification of those different interests is not essential to the theory of ideology put forward here. Rather, this theory makes possible a systematic analysis and observation of those very interests.

22 I concur with Habermas that every knowledge producing activity is guided by an interest. However I do not agree with his pinpointing and categorization of these interests. I think interest should be understood in a much more concrete way. Jürgen Habermas: *Knowledge and Human Interest* (Cambridge, 1987), 307ff.

23 Paul Ricoeur: *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 16.

24 Paul Ricoeur: *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 301.

25 Karl Mannheim: *Ideology and Utopia*, 192ff.

26 Paul Ricoeur: *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 312ff.

27 Fredric Jameson: *The Political Unconscious. Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, (Ithaca, 1981), see especially chapter 6: »Conclusion: The Dialectic of Utopia and Ideology«.

28 Ernst Wigforss (1881-1977) was a Swedish, social democratic theoretician as well as finance minister of Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s.

29 One could argue that this idea functions as an alibi for political inactivity, for dutifully set up goals that one does not have to take seriously, or conflating means and ends. That is a correct observation, but at the same time points to the precarious in critique of ideology in general.

30 Ernst Wigforss: »Om provisoriska utopier«, in *Insikt och handling*, no.2, 1958, 100. My translation.

31 Ernst Wigforss: »Om provisoriska utopier«, 118f.

32 This point is made clear by Žižek's critique of that part of the political Left which has as its project the protection and rebuilding of the traditional welfare state. See Slavoj Žižek: *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously* (London, 2012), 15ff.

33 For Wigforss this is an almost scientific endeavor, since he truly believes that justice and equality is rational, at least in the traditions stemming from the Enlightenment. Ernst Wigforss: »Om provisoriska utopier«, 108f.
